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Abstract
Cloud services have turned remote computation into a commodity and enable convenient online
collaboration. However, they require that clients fully trust the service provider in terms of con-
fidentiality, integrity, and availability. Towards reducing this dependency, this paper introduces a
protocol for verification of integrity and consistency for cloud object storage (VICOS), which en-
ables a group of mutually trusting clients to detect data-integrity and consistency violations for a
cloud object-storage service. It aims at services where multiple clients cooperate on data stored
remotely on a potentially misbehaving service. VICOS enforces the consistency notion of fork-line-
arizability, supports wait-free client semantics for most operations, and reduces the computation and
communication overhead compared to previous protocols. VICOS is based in a generic way on any
authenticated data structure. Moreover, its operations cover the hierarchical name space of a cloud
object store, supporting a real-world interface and not only a simplistic abstraction. A prototype of
VICOS that works with the key-value store interface of commodity cloud storage services has been
implemented, and an evaluation demonstrates its advantage compared to existing systems.
1 Introduction
More and more data is outsourced to the cloud, and collaborating on a shared resource using cloud
services has become easier than ever. Programmers work together on online source code repositories,
global project teams produce technical deliverables, and friends share their photo albums. Nevertheless,
the clients need to trust the cloud provider as rely on it for the confidentiality and correctness of their
data. Encryption may preserve the confidentiality of data but cannot prevent inadvertent or malicious
data modifications. This work shows how to protect the integrity and consistency of data on an untrusted
cloud storage service accessed by multiple clients.
With a single client only, the client may locally keep a short cryptographic hash value of the out-
sourced data. Later, this can be used to verify the integrity of the data returned by the cloud storage
service. However, with multiple disconnected clients, no common synchronization, and no communica-
tion among the clients, neither hashing nor digital signatures are sufficient by themselves. The reason is
that a malicious or Byzantine server may violate the consistency of the data, for example, by reordering
or omitting properly authenticated operations, so that the views of the storage state at different clients
∗A short version of this work appears in the proceedings of SYSTOR 2015. DOI: 10.1145/2757667.2757681
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diverge. A malicious cloud server may pretend to one set of clients that some operations by others sim-
ply did not occur. In other words, freshness can be violated and the clients cannot detect such replay
attacks until they communicate directly. The problem is particularly relevant in cryptographic online
voting and for web certificate transparency [22].
The strongest achievable notion of consistency in this multi-client model is captured by fork-line-
arizability, introduced by Mazie`res and Shasha [26]. A consistency and integrity verification protocol
may guarantee this notion by adding condensed data about the causal evolution of the client’s views into
their interaction with the server. This ensures that if the server creates only a single discrepancy between
the views of two clients, these clients may never observe operations of each other afterwards. In other
words, if the server ever lies to some clients and these clients communicate later, they will immediately
discover the violation. Hence, with only one check they can verify a large number of past operations.
The SUNDR system [23] pioneered fork-linearizable consistency and demonstrated a network file
system protected by a hash tree of every user’s files. SUNDR uses an expensive protocol, requiring
messages of size Ω(n2) for n clients [10]. Like other systems providing fork-linearizability, it suffers
from the inherent limitation that sometimes, even with a correct server, clients have to block and cannot
proceed with their next operation because other clients are concurrently executing operations [10].
In order to prevent blocking, FAUST [8], SPORC [13], and Venus [30] relax their guarantees to
weak fork-linearizability, which establishes consistency only eventually, after further operations occur;
this is not desirable because a client may only know later that a protocol output was not correct. SPORC
and the related Blind Stone Tablet (BST) [34] protocol shift the maintenance of state to the clients,
such that the server is merely responsible for coordination; every client holds a complete copy of the
system’s state. This contradicts the goal of outsourcing data to the cloud. Another way to avoid blocking
is explored by BST and COP [9]: they let any commuting operations proceed immediately.
In this paper, we present VICOS, a verification protocol for the integrity and consistency of cloud ob-
ject storage, which overcomes these limitations and demonstrates a complete practical system. VICOS
supports the optimal consistency notion of fork-linearizability, provides wait-free semantics for all com-
patible client operations, and has smaller overhead than previous protocols. The notion of compatible
operations, as introduced here, generalizes the progress condition over commuting operations, which are
considered in past work. Informally, two operations o and ω are compatible if executing o before ω does
not influence the behavior of ω (neither its effects nor its output value). Conceptually, VICOS is based
on abstract authenticated data structures in a modular way. Moreover, it unifies the two different lines
of work on this problem so far, namely, the untrusted storage protocols [23, 10, 8] that feature remote
state and are based on vector clocks, and the remote service verification protocols [34, 13, 9], which
create local copies of the state and use hash chains. In particular, VICOS maintains state remotely, at
the server, but uses hash chains for consistency verification. Furthermore, VICOS incurs only a con-
stant communication overhead per operation, independent of the number of clients, whereas FAUST and
Venus require vector clocks of size Ω(n) with n clients.
We have implemented and evaluated VICOS with a commodity cloud object store; the results
demonstrate that the overhead for distributed, multi-client integrity and consistency verification is low.
VICOS protects a complete cloud storage service (assuming it has atomic semantics), spanning many
objects and offering read, write, delete, and directory listing operations; this stands in contrast to
Venus [30], which only provided consistency for a single data object. Furthermore, VICOS notifies
the clients whenever the integrity or consistency is violated but does not address recovery operations.
1.1 Contributions
This work makes the following contributions towards ensuring integrity for data stored on untrusted
cloud providers:
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• A novel abstract protocol to verify the integrity and consistency of a generic service based on an
authenticated data structure [32], which ensures fork-linearizability, supports wait-free semantics
for compatible operations, and incurs only constant communication overhead. This protocol also
generalizes authenticated data structures to multiple writers.
• An instantiation of this protocol for a commodity cloud object store, called VICOS. It represents
the first integrity protection protocol with all of the above features for the standard operations of
a cloud object store.
• An implementation and evaluation of VICOS using COSBench, demonstrating its practicality. In
particular, the overhead of VICOS for integrity protection remains acceptable small with moderate
concurrency and increases slightly when many clients access the same data concurrently. The
prototype is available open-source.
1.2 Organization
The paper continues with introducing the model and defines our notion of an authenticated data structure
(ADS). Sec. 3 presents the abstract integrity protocol for ADS and discusses its properties. VICOS is
introduced in Sec. 4 and the evaluation appears in Sec. 6. Related work is discussed in Sec. 7.
2 Model
We consider an asynchronous distributed system with n mutually trusting clients C1, ..., Cn and a
server S. The communication between the server and the clients is reliable and respects first-in first-out
(FIFO) semantics. Clients cannot communicate with each other. A protocol P specifies the behavior of
the clients and the server. All clients are correct and hence follow P ; in particular, they do not crash
(although crashes could be tolerated with extra measures in the protocols). The server is either correct
and follows P or Byzantine, deviating arbitrarily from P .
The clients invoke operations of a stateful functionality F , implementing a set of deterministic
operations; F defines a response and a state change for every operation. We use the standard notions
of executions, histories, sequential histories, real-time order, concurrency, and well-formed executions
from the literature [3]. In particular, every operation in an execution is represented by an invocation event
and a response event. We extend F with a special return value ABORT that allows an operation to abort
without taking effect, which may be used when concurrent operations would cause it to block [24, 9].
2.1 Consistency properties
When S is correct, the protocols should provide the standard notion of linearizability [19] with respect
to F . It requires that an execution of operations by all clients together is equivalent to an imaginary se-
quential execution of F . More precisely, for an execution to be linearizable, all invocation and response
events occuring at all clients can be permuted into one totally ordered sequence, where (1) every oper-
ation invocation is followed immediately by the corresponding response; (2) all operations are correct
according to the specification of F ; and (3) the operations in the sequence respect the real-time order
among operations observed in the execution.
Fork-linearizability [26, 10] relaxes this common global view and permits that the clients observe
an execution that may split into multiple linearizable “forks,” which must never join again. More pre-
cisely, an execution is fork-linearizable when every client observes a linearizable history (containing all
operations that the client executes itself) and for any operation observed by multiple clients, the history
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of events occurring before the operation is the same at those clients. This implies that if the views of the
execution at two clients ever diverge, they cannot observe each other’s operations any more, and makes
it easy to spot consistency violations by the server.
Furthermore, we recall the concept of a fork-linearizable Byzantine emulation [10]. It requires that
our protocol among the clients and the Byzantine server satisfies two conditions: When the server is
correct, then the service is linearizable; otherwise, it is still fork-linearizable. Finally, our protocol may
only abort (by returning ABORT) if there is some reason for this; in other words, when the clients execute
operations sequentially, then no client ever aborts.
2.2 Cryptographic primitives
Our protocols use a cryptographic hash function and digital signature schemes for protecting data against
modification. We model them in an idealized way, as if implemented by a distributed oracle [7].
A cryptographic hash function hash maps a bit string x of arbitrary length to a short, unique hash
value h. Its implementation is deterministic and maintains a list L of all x that have been queried so
far. When the invocation contains x ∈ L, then hash responds with the index of x in L; otherwise, hash
appends x to L and returns its index. This ideal implementation models only collision resistance, i.e.,
that it is not feasible to find two different values x1 and x2 such that hash(x1) = hash(x2).
A digital signature scheme as used here provides two functions, signi and verifyi, to ensure the
authenticity of a message created by a known client. The scheme works as follows: A client Ci in-
vokes signi(m) with a message m as argument and obtains a signature φ ∈ {0, 1}∗ with the response.
Only client Ci can invoke signi. When m and φ are sent to another client, that client may verify the
integrity of m. It invokes verifyi(φ,m) and obtains TRUE as a response if and only if Ci has executed
signi(m); otherwise, verifyi(φ,m) returns FALSE. Every client, as well as S, may invoke verify.
2.3 Authenticated data structures
This section defines the model of authenticated data structures (ADS) used here. Authenticated data
structures [28, 25, 32] are a well-known tool for verifying operations and their results over data out-
sourced to untrusted servers. Popular instantiations rely on Merkle hash trees or other hierarchical
authenticated search structures [17, 27].
We model an ADS for an arbitrary deterministic functionality F . Departing from the literature
on ADSs, we eliminate the special role of the single writer or “source” and let any client perform
update operations; likewise, we unify queries and updates into one type of operation from a set O.
Operations may contain arguments according to F , but these are subsumed into the different o ∈ O.
The functionality specifies a state s ∈ S, which will be maintained by the server, starting with an
initial state s0. For example, this may include all data stored on a cloud storage service. Given s,
applying an operation o of F means to compute (s′, r)← F (s, o), resulting in a new state s′ ∈ S and a
response r ∈ R.
Operations are executed by the clients and formally described by an invocation event and a response
event occurring at the client. In order to verify the responses of S, a client stores an authenticator a, a
short value also called a digest. Initially, the authenticator is a special value a0.
For executing an operation o, the client invokes algorithm queryF on S,
(r, σo) ← queryF (s, o),
producing a response r and auxiliary data σo for o; the latter may serve as a proof for the validity of the
response. Then the client locally performs an operation authexecF to validate the response on the basis
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of the authenticator. From this the client obtains an output
(a′, σ′o, v) ← authexecF (o, a, r, σo).
Here a′ and σ′0 are the updated authenticator and auxiliary data, respectively, and v ∈ {FALSE, TRUE}
denotes a Boolean verification value that tells the client whether the response r from S is valid.
The client should then send σ′o back to S, so that the server may actually execute o and update its
state from s to s′ by running refreshF as
s′ ← refreshF (s, o, σ′o).
Note we may also consider these operations for sequences of operations.
An ADS [28, 25, 32] is a special case of this formalization, in which the operations O can be
partitioned into update-operations U and query-operations Q. Update operations generate no response,
i.e., F (s, u) = (s′,⊥) for all u ∈ U and queries do not change the state, that is, F (s, q) = (s, r) for all
q ∈ Q.
Furthermore, an ADS may contain initialization and key-generation routines and all algorithms may
take public and private keys as inputs in addition. For simplicity, and because our ADS implementations
are unkeyed, we omit them here.
An ADS satisfies correctness and security. Consider the execution of a sequence 〈o1, . . . , om〉 of
operations, F (s0, 〈o1, . . . , om〉), which means to compute (sj , rj) ← F (sj−1, oj) for j = 1, . . . ,m. A
proper authenticated execution of 〈o1, . . . , om〉 computes the steps
(rj , σo,j) ← queryF (sj−1, oj)
(aj , σ
′
o,j , vj) ← authexecF (oj , aj−1, rj , σo,j)
sj ← refreshF (sj−1, oj , σ′o,j).
such that vj = TRUE, for j = 1, . . . ,m.
An ADS is correct if the proper authenticated execution of any operation sequence 〈o1, . . . , om〉
outputs state sm and response rm such that (sm, rm) = F (s0, 〈o1, . . . , om〉).
Furthermore, an ADS must be secure against an adversary A that tries to forge a response and
auxiliary data that are considered valid by a client. More precisely,A adaptively determines an operation
sequence 〈o1, . . . , om〉, which is taken through a proper authenticated execution by a challenger; at every
step,A obtains aj and σ′o,j and then determines oj+1 and whether the execution continues. Finally, after
obtaining am and sm, A outputs an operation o∗, a response r∗, and a value σ∗o . The ADS is secure if
no A succeeds in creating o∗, r∗, s∗m, and σ∗o such that
(·, ·, TRUE) = authexecF (o∗, am, r∗, σ∗o)
but F (sm, o∗) = (sm+1, rm+1) with rm+1 6= r∗. (The “don’t-care” symbol · in the tuple indicates that
only a subset of the tuple elements are needed.) In other words, A cannot find any o∗ executed on sm
and forge a response r∗ and a proof for o∗ that is accepted by the client, unless the response is correct
according to F and r∗ = rm+1.
Note that this formalization represents an “idealized” security notion. It is easy to formulate an
equivalent computational security condition using the language of modern cryptology [15]. This model
subsumes the one of Cachin [6] and generalizes ADS [32] to multiple writing clients, where here the
authenticator is implicitly synchronized among the clients.
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2.4 Compatible operations
Our protocol takes advantage of compatible operations that permit “concurrent” execution without com-
promising the goal of ensuring fork-linearizability to the clients. An operation o′ is compatible with
another operation o (in a state s) if the presence of o′ before o does not influence the return value of o
(in s). Compatible operations can be executed without blocking; this improves the throughput com-
pared to earlier protocols, in particular with respect to COP [9], which considered the stronger notion of
commutative operations.
Formally, we say an operation sequence ω is compatible with an operation o in a state s whenever
the responses of o remain the same regardless of whether ω executed before o. Hence, with
(s′, r) ← F (s, ω); (s′′, p) ← F (s′, o); and
(t′, q) ← F (s, o)
it holds p = q. Moreover, we say that ω is compatible with o if and only if ω is compatible with o in all
states s ∈ S of F .
In algorithms we use a function compatibleF , which takes ω and o as inputs and returns TRUE if and
only if ω and o are compatible.
In the terminology of the database literature [33], two operations are compatible if and only if they
do not exhibit a “write-read” conflict, which is also known as a “dirty read.”
Note that compatible operations are not necessarily commutative, but commutative operations are
always compatible. For instance, a query operation q is compatible with an update u in any state; but
when q returns data modified by u, then q and u do not commute.
3 The ADS integrity protocol (AIP)
This section introduces the ADS integrity protocol (AIP), a generic protocol to verify the integrity and
consistency for any authenticated data structure (ADS) operated by a remote untrusted server. AIP
extends and improves upon the commutative-operation verification protocol (COP) and its authenticated
variant (ACOP) of Cachin and Ohrimenko [9]. Sec. 4 shows how to instantiate AIP with an authenticated
dictionary for protecting cloud storage; the result forms the core of VICOS.
3.1 Overview
The processing of one operation in AIP is structured into an active and a passive phase, as shown
in Fig. 1. The active phase begins when the client invokes an operation and ends when the client
completes it and outputs a response; this takes one message roundtrip between the client and the server.
Different from past protocols, the client stays further involved with processing authentication data for
this operation during the passive phase, which is decoupled from the execution of further operations.
More precisely, when client Ci invokes an operation o ∈ O, it sends a signed INVOKE message
carrying o to the server S. The server assigns a global sequence number (t) to o and responds with a
REPLY message containing a list of pending operations, the response, an authenticator, and auxiliary
data needed by the client for verification. Operations are pending (for o) because they have been started
by other clients and S has ordered them before o, but S has not yet finished processing them. We
distinguish between pending-other operations, which have been invoked by other clients, and pending-
self operations, which Ci has executed before o.
After receiving the REPLY message, the client checks its content. In particular, if the pending-other
operations are compatible with o, then Ci verifies the pending-self operations including o with the help
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Client Ci Server S
INVOKE
REPLY
COMMIT
UPDAT
E-AUTH
COMMIT-AUTH
aip-invoke
return
Active
phase
Passive
phase
Figure 1. Protocol messages in AIP.
of the authenticator; if they are correct, Ci proceeds and outputs the response immediately. Along
the way Ci verifies that all data received from S satisfies conditions to ensure fork-linearizability. An
operation that terminates like this is called successful; alternatively, when the pending-other operations
are not compatible with o, then o aborts. In this case, Ci returns the symbol ABORT. In any case,
the client subsequently commits o and sends a signed COMMIT message to S (note that also aborted
operations are committed in that sense). This step terminates the active phase of the operation. The
client may now invoke the next operation or retry o if it was aborted.
Processing of o continues with the passive phase. At some (later) time, as soon as the operation
immediately preceding o in the assigned order has terminated its own passive phase, S sends an UPDATE-
AUTH message with auxiliary data and the authenticator of the preceding operation to Ci. When Ci
receives this, it validates the message content and verifies the execution of o unless o had been aborted.
Using the methods of the ADS, the client now computes and signs a new authenticator that it sends
to S in a COMMIT-AUTH message. We say that Ci authenticates o at this time. When S receives this
message, then it applies o by executing it on the state and stores the corresponding authenticator; this
completes the passive phase of o.
Note that the server may receive COMMIT messages in an order that differs from the one of the glob-
ally assigned sequence numbers due to asynchrony. Still, the authentication steps in the passive phases
of the different operations must proceed according to the assigned operation order. For this reason, the
server maintains a second sequence number (b), which indicates the last authenticated operation that the
server has applied to its state. Hence, S buffers the incoming COMMIT messages and runs the passive
phases sequentially in the assigned order.
For ensuring consistency, every client needs to know about all operations that the server has exe-
cuted. Therefore, when S responds to the invocation of an operation by Ci, it includes in the REPLY
message a summary (including the corresponding signatures) of all those operations that Ci has missed
since it last executed an operation. Prior to committing o, the client verifies these operations and thereby
clears them.
3.2 Notation
The protocol is shown in Alg. 1–3 and formulated reactively. The clients and the server are state ma-
chines whose actions are triggered by events such as receiving messages. An ordered list with elements
e1, e2, . . . , ek is denoted by E = 〈e1, e2, . . . , ek〉; the element with index j may be accessed as E[j].
We also use maps that operate as associative arrays and store values under unique keys. A value v is
stored in a map H by assigning it to a key k, denoted by H[k] ← v; for non-assigned keys, the map
returns ⊥. The symbol ‖ denotes the concatenation of bit strings. The assert statement, parameterized
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by a condition, catches an error and immediately terminates the protocol when the condition is false.
Clients use this to signal that the server misbehaved.
3.3 Data structures
This section describes the data structures maintained by every client and by the server. For simplicity,
the pseudo code does not describe garbage collection, but we note where this is possible.
Every client Ci (Alg. 1) stores the sequence number of its last cleared operation in a variable c. The
hash chainH represents the condensed view thatCi has of the sequence of all operations. It is computed
over the sequence of all applied operations and the sequence of pending operations announced by S.
Formally, H is a map indexed by operation sequence number; an entry H[l] is equal to hash(H[l −
1]‖o‖l‖j) when the l-th operation o is executed by Cj , with H[0] = NULL. Variable Z is a map
that represents the status (SUCCESS or ABORT) of every operation, according to the result of the test
for compatibility. The client only needs the entries in H and Z with indices greater than c and may
garbage-collect older entries. Finally, Ci uses a variable u that is set to o whenever Ci has invoked
operation o but not yet completed it; otherwise u is ⊥.
The server (Alg. 3) maintains the sequence number of the most recently invoked operation in a
counter t. In addition to that, the counter b contains the sequence number of the most recently applied
operation and governs the authentication of operations in the passive phase. Every invoked operation
is stored in a map I and every committed operation in a map O; both maps are indexed by sequence
number. The server only needs the entries in I with sequence numbers greater than b. An entry in O, at
a sequence number b or greater, has to be stored until every client has committed some operation with
a higher sequence number and may be removed later. Most importantly, the server keeps the state s of
the ADS for F , which reflects all successful operations up to sequence number b. In contrast to COP [9]
and SPORC [13], where every client maintains a complete copy of the state, here only the server stores
that state. Moreover, S stores the authenticator for every operation in a map A indexed by sequence
number.
3.4 The protocol in detail
This section describes the ADS integrity protocol (AIP) as shown in Alg. 1–3. AIP is parameterized by
an ADS and a functionality F that specifies its operations through queryF , authexecF , and refreshF . The
client invokes AIP with an ADS-operation o by calling aip-invoke(o); it completes when AIP executes
return at the end of the handler for the REPLY message. This ends the active phase of AIP, and the
passive phase continues asynchronously in the background.
3.4.1 Active phase
When client Ci invokes an operation o, it computes an INVOKE-signature τ over o and i; this proves to
other clients that Ci has invoked o. Then Ci stores o in u and sends an INVOKE message with o and τ to
the server.
Upon receiving an INVOKE message with o, the server increments the sequence number t, assigns
it to o, and assembles the REPLY message for Ci. First, S stores o and the accompanying signature
in I[t]; the value t is also called the position of o. The pending operations for o, assigned to ω, are
found in I[b+ 1], . . . , I[t], i.e., starting with the oldest non-applied operation, and include o. In order to
compute the response and the auxiliary data for o from the correct state, the server must then extract the
successful pending-self operations µ of Ci, using the following method:
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function separate-pending(i, ω)
µ← 〈〉; γ ← 〈〉
for k = 1, . . . , length(ω) do
(o′, ·, j)← ω[k]
if j = i then
if k = length(ω) ∨ status of o′ is SUCCESS then
µ← µ ◦ 〈o′〉 // see text how to get status of o′
else if j 6= i then
γ ← γ ◦ 〈o′〉
return (µ, γ)
This method is common to the server and the clients. Note that µ includes the current operation
(which appears at the end of ω) but not the aborted operations of Ci. The server finds the status of
a pending-self operation o′ of Ci in O[b + k] (except for o itself, obviously) because Ci has already
committed o′ prior to invoking o and because the messages between Ci and S are FIFO-ordered. On the
other hand, Ci retrieves the status of o′ from Z[b+ k].
Then S computes the response r and auxiliary data σo by calling queryF (s, µ) from the ADS for F ;
the response therefore takes into account the state reached after the successful pending-self operations
of Ci but excludes any pending-other operations present in ω. However, the client will only execute o
and output r when γ is compatible with o and, therefore, Ci is guaranteed a view in which the operations
of γ occur after o. This will ensure fork-linearizability. The REPLY message to Ci also includes A[b]
containing the authenticator and its AUTH-signature, for the operation with sequence number b. The
client passes these to authexecF of µ for verifying the correctness of the response. Furthermore, the RE-
PLY message contains δ, the list of all operations that have been authenticated since Ci’s last operation.
In particular, when c is the sequence number from the INVOKE message, δ contains the operations at
sequence numbers c+ 1, . . . , b; when c = b, however, δ contains still O[b].
After receiving the REPLY message from S, the client (1) processes and clears the authenticated
operations in δ, (2) verifies the pending operations in ω, and (3) verifies that r is the correct response
for o. These steps are explained next.
For verifying and processing δ and the last signed authenticator in α, client Ci calls a function
check-view and verifies and/or extends the hash chain for every operation and verifies the corresponding
COMMIT-signature. In particular, this ensures for any operation which has been pending forCi and must
be cleared, that the same operation was also authenticated by its originator. Finally, Ci also checks the
AUTH-signature on the authenticator a, which is contained in α. If successful, all operations in δ are
cleared and Ci’s operation counter c is advanced to the position of the last operation in δ. (The check
for b = c ensures that δ contains at least one operation at position c.)
The client continues in check-pending by verifying that the pending operations are announced cor-
rectly: for every operation in ω, it determines the sequence number l, verifies the corresponding IN-
VOKE-signature τ , and checks the hash chain entry H[l]. If there is no entry in H for l, then Ci com-
putes the new entry from o, l, j, and H[l − 1]; otherwise, Ci verifies the that existing entry matches the
expected value. If this validation succeeds, it means the operation is consistent with a pending operation
sent previously by S. After iterating through the pending operations, the client checks also that the last
operation in ω is indeed its own current operation o.
Next, Ci invokes separate-pending to extract µ and γ from ω (see earlier). Then, Ci checks whether
γ is compatible with u (the last invoked operation). If yes,Ci calls the ADS operation authexecF (µ, a, r, σo)
for verifying that applying the operations in µ yields r as the response (recall that µ includes o at the
end). The goal of this step is only to check the correctness of the response, and the authenticator and aux-
iliary data output by authexecF are ignored. Finally, Ci commits o by generating a COMMIT-signature
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Algorithm 1 ADS integrity protocol (AIP) for client Ci
state
c ∈ N0: sequence number of last cleared operation, initially 0
H : N0 → {0, 1}∗: the hash chain, initially only H[0] = ⊥
Z : N0 → Z: status map, initially empty
u ∈ O ∪ {⊥}: current operation or ⊥ if none, initially ⊥
function aip-invoke(o)
u← o
τ ← signi(INVOKE‖o‖i)
send message [INVOKE, o, τ, c] to S
upon receiving message [REPLY, δ, b, α, ω, t, r, σo] from S do
(a, ψ)← α
check-view(δ, b, a, ψ)
check-pending(ω)
(µ, γ)← separate-pending(i, ω)
t← b+ length(ω)
if compatibleF (γ, u) then
(·, ·, v)← authexecF (µ, a, r, σo)
assert v
Z[t]← SUCCESS
else
r ← ABORT
Z[t]← ABORT
φ← signi(COMMIT‖t‖u‖i‖Z[t]‖H[t])
send message [COMMIT, u, t, Z[t], φ] to S
u← ⊥
return r // response of operation aip-invoke(o)
upon recv. msg. [UPDATE-AUTH, o, r, σo, φ, q, δ, α] from S do
assert verifyi(φ, COMMIT‖q‖o‖i‖Z[q]‖H[q])
(oδ, ·, ·, ·, j)← δ
(a, ψ)← α
assert verifyj(ψ, AUTH‖oδ‖q − 1‖H[q − 1]‖a)
if Z[q] = SUCCESS then
(a′, σ′o, v)← authexecF (o, a, r, σo)
assert v
else
(a′, σ′0)← (a,⊥)
ψ′ ← signi(AUTH‖o‖q‖H[q]‖a′)
send message [COMMIT-AUTH, a′, σ′o, ψ
′] to S
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Algorithm 2 ADS integrity protocol (AIP) for client Ci, continued
function extend-chain(o, l, j)
if H[l] = ⊥ then
H[l]← hash(H[l − 1]‖o‖l‖j) // extend by one
else if H[l] 6= hash(H[l − 1]‖o‖l‖j) then
return FALSE // server replies are inconsistent
return TRUE
function check-view(δ, b, a, ψ)
assert length(δ) ≥ 1
if b = c then d← c− 1 else d← c
for k = 1, . . . , length(δ) do
l← d+ k
(o, z, φ, j)← δ[k]
assert extend-chain(o, l, j)
assert verifyj(φ, COMMIT‖l‖o‖j‖z‖H[l])
assert verifyj(ψ, AUTH‖o‖b‖H[b]‖a) // variables o and j keep their values
c← d+ length(δ) // all operations in δ have been cleared
function check-pending(ω)
assert length(ω) ≥ 1
for k = 1, . . . , length(ω) do
l← c+ k
(o, τ, j)← ω[k]
assert extend-chain(o, l, j) ∧ verifyj(τ, INVOKE‖o‖j)
assert o = u ∧ j = i // variables o and j keep their values
over t, the sequence number of o, its status, and its hash chain entry, sends a COMMIT message (with t,
the operation, and the signature) to S, and outputs the response r.
3.4.2 Passive phase
The server stores the content of all incoming COMMIT messages in O and processes them in the order
of their sequence numbers, indicated by b. When an operation with sequence number b + 1 has been
committed but not yet authenticated by the client and applied by S (i.e., uponO[b+1] 6= ⊥∧A[b+1] =
⊥), the server uses queryF to compute the response r and to extract the auxiliary data σo from the current
state s. It sends this in an UPDATE-AUTH message to Ci, also including the operation at position b (from
O[b]) and its authenticator (taken from A[b]), which have been computed before. These values allow the
client to verify the authenticity of the response for the operation at position b+ 1.
The client Ci then receives this UPDATE-AUTH message (for o and sequence number q), and first
validates the message contents. In particular, Ci verifies that the authenticator a is covered by a valid
AUTH-signature by client Cj with sequence number q − 1, using Ci’s hash chain entry H[q − 1].
Next, if o was not aborted, i.e., Z[q] = SUCCESS, the client invokes authexecF to verify that the
auxiliary data and the response are correct, and to generate new auxiliary data s′o and a new authenti-
cator a′, which vouches for the correctness of the state updates induced by o. Otherwise, Ci skips this
step, as the authenticator does not change. Then Ci issues an AUTH-signature ψ′ and sends it back to S
together with a′ and s′o in a COMMIT-AUTH message.
As the last step in the passive phase, S increments b, stores the data in the COMMIT-AUTH message
at A[b], and if the operation did not abort, S applies it to s through refreshF .
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Algorithm 3 ADS integrity protocol (AIP) for server S
state
t ∈ N0: seqno. of last invoked op., initially 0
b ∈ N0: seqno. of last applied op., initially 0
I : N→ O× {0, 1}∗ × N: invoked ops., initially empty
O : N→ O× {0, 1}∗ ×Z × {0, 1}∗ × N: committed ops., initially empty
A : N0 → {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}∗: authenticators, init. A[0] = a0
s ∈ {0, 1}∗: state of the service, initially s = s0
upon receiving message [INVOKE, o, τ, c] from Ci do
t← t+ 1
I[t]← (o, τ, i)
if b = c then δ ← 〈O[b]〉 else δ ← 〈O[c+ 1], . . . , O[b]〉
ω ← 〈I[b+ 1], I[b+ 2], . . . , I[t]〉 // all pending operations
(µ, ·)← separate-pending(i, ω)
(r, σo)← queryF (s, µ)
send message [REPLY, δ, b, A[b], ω, t, r, σo] to Ci
upon receiving message [COMMIT, o, q, z, φ] from Ci do
O[q]← (o, z, φ, i)
upon O[b+ 1] 6= ⊥ ∧A[b+ 1] = ⊥ do
(o, z, φ, j)← O[b+ 1]
if z = SUCCESS then
(r, σo)← queryF (s, o)
else
(r, σo)← (⊥,⊥)
send msg. [UPDATE-AUTH, o, r, σo, φ, b+ 1, O[b], A[b]] to Cj
upon receiving message [COMMIT-AUTH, a, σo, ψ] from Ci do
b← b+ 1
A[b]← (a, ψ)
(o, z, ·, ·)← O[b]
if z = SUCCESS then
s← refreshF (s, o, σo)
3.5 Remarks
As in BST [34] and in COP [9], operations that do not interfere with each other may proceed without
blocking. More precisely, if some pending operation is not compatible with the current operation, the
latter is aborted and must be retried later. Preventing clients from blocking is highly desirable but cannot
always be guaranteed without introducing aborts [10]. The potential for blocking has led other systems,
including SPORC [13] and FAUST [8], to adopt weaker and less desirable guarantees than fork-linear-
izability.
Obviously, it makes no sense for a client to retry its operation while the non-compatible operation
is still pending. However, the client does not know when the contending operation commits. Additional
communication between the server and the clients could be introduced to signal this. Alternatively, the
client may employ a probabilistic waiting strategy and retry after a random delay.
In the following we assume that S is correct. The communication cost of AIP amounts to the five
messages per operation. Every client eventually learns about all operations of all clients, as it must
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clear them and include them in its hash chain. However, this occurs only when the client executes an
operation (in REPLY). At all other times between operations, the client may be offline and inactive.
In a system with n clients that performs h operations in total, BST [34] and COP [9] require Θ(nh)
messages overall. AIP reduces this cost to Θ(h) messages, which means that each client only processes
a small constant number of messages per operation.
The size of the INVOKE, COMMIT, UPDATE-AUTH, and COMMIT-AUTH messages does not depend
on the number of clients and on the number operations they execute. The size of the REPLY message
is influenced by the amount of contention, as it contains the pending operations. If one client is slow,
the pending operations may grow with the number of further operations executed by other clients. Note
that the oldest pending operation is the one at sequence number b + 1; hence, all operations ordered
afterwards are treated as pending, even when they already have been committed. The REPLY message
can easily be compressed to constant size, however, by omitting the pending operations that have already
been sent in a previous message to the same client. See the protocol extensions in Sec. 3.7 for further
discussion.
The functionality-dependent cost, in terms of communicated state and auxiliary data, is directly
related to the ADS for F . In practice, hierarchical authenticated search structures, such as hash trees
and authenticated skip lists, permit small authenticators and auxiliary data [12].
3.6 Correctness
We consider three cases: (1) S is correct and the clients execute operations (1a) sequentially or (1b)
concurrently; and (2) S is malicious.
In case (1a), all operations execute one after each other. When, furthermore, the COMMIT-AUTH
message from a client reaches S before the next operation is invoked, then AIP is similar to “serialized”
SUNDR [23] and the “lock-step protocol” of Cachin [6]. This means that a client Ci executing an
operation o receives a REPLY message with all authenticated operations that exist in the system and
only o as pending operation. Then t = b+ 1, and later Ci commits o and authenticates o without further
operations intermixed at S nor at any client. Clearly, this execution is linearizable and satisfies the first
condition of a fork-linearizable Byzantine emulation.
In case (1b), there may exist pending-other operations, but since Ci verifies that its own operations
are compatible with them, the response value is correct. As S is correct, the views of all clients are
equal, i.e., prefixes of each other, and this ensures linearizability.
For case (2), note that every clientCi starts to extend its view from a cleared, authenticated operation
and the corresponding signed authenticator a. If the pending-other operations in γ are compatible with o
and the response is valid w.r.t. a (according to authexecF ), then it is safe for Ci to output the response
and thereby include it into its view. The malicious S may order the operations in γ differently at other
clients, creating a fork, but they can be omitted from the view of Ci. The hash chain maintained by
Ci contains a condensed representation of its entire view. By using its own hash chain entry during the
verification of the COMMIT and AUTH signatures of other clients, Ci ensures that the views of these
other clients are equal. Hence, whenever an operation o appears in the views of two clients, also their
views are the same up to o. This ensures fork-linearizability.
3.7 Extensions
In order to keep the complexity of the protocol description for AIP at a comprehensible level, we present
important efficiency improvements informally here.
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Eliminating aborted operations. The first extension removes aborted operations from being consid-
ered as pending. Recall that in AIP, an operation o is included with the pending operations until the
executing client has authenticated o and the server has processed it during the respective background
phase, even if the operation was aborted. This has the drawback that later operations may not be com-
patible with o and abort unnecessarily. However, if o was aborted, this has been committed by the client,
and S has received its COMMIT message, then S can include this with the list of pending operations sent
for a later operation o′. The client that executes o′ will take into account that o was aborted and ignore it
for determining whether o′ is compatible with the pending operations. Depending on the workload, this
reduces further aborts.
Batching and delegating operation authentication. Recall that the clients authenticate operations
in the order of the server-assigned sequence numbers. Some client Cslow may fall behind with this
step, and when the other clients proceed faster and execute more operations, the number of pending
operations grows continuously. This creates much more work for the faster clients for processing the
REPLY message and slows them down.
However, since all clients trust each other, one can modify AIP such that another clientCfast may step
in for Cslow, handle the UPDATE-AUTH message, and sign the authenticator for the operation of Cslow.
Only small changes to the data structures are needed to accommodate this change. Ideally Cfast has
more processing power or is closer to S on the network than Cslow; this choice should be determined
heuristically based on the measured performance or network delays.
Extending the above idea, S may actually batch all non-authenticated operations when an operation
from Ci commits at sequence number q. Hence, S sends the UPDATE-AUTH messages for all operations
between b and q to Ci and delegates the step of authenticating them to Ci. This works because a client
can authenticate two consecutive operations without going back to S. The server may then record the
COMMIT-AUTH responses from the fastest client and inform the others that their help with authenticating
operations is no longer needed.
Passive phase only for update operations. Recall that the protocol executes a functionality F whose
operations can be separated into query and update operations (Q and U , respectively). Queries do not
change the state; as is easy to see, they are compatible with every subsequent operation. But the passive
phase of AIP is only needed for creating a new authenticator, after the state has changed. Therefore we
can eliminate the passive phase for all query operations; this considerably improves the efficiency of the
protocol for read-intensive applications.
In particular, for every operation o ∈ Q, the passive phase is skipped and the verification operations
are adjusted accordingly. When a client Ci has committed a query operation, the server immediately
“applies” it and does not send an UPDATE-AUTH message later. For implementing this, the sever has to
maintain another variable d with the sequence number of the operation that most recently modified the
state. The REPLY and UPDATE-AUTH messages now contain the operation O[d] that allows clients to
verify the corresponding authenticator A[d].
Tolerate client crashes. Crashes of clients are not included in the formal model here, but must be
considered in practice. In order to tolerate crashes, we reuse the second extension above. Since a
client Cfail may crash before it finishes both protocol phases, the server will never receive the missing
message(s) and the operation is never authenticated. Going beyond our formal model, suppose that
another client Ci has determined that Cfail has crashed. Then Ci may take over, abort the hanging
operations, and commit and authenticated in place of the failed client. It is important that Cfail must
not execute any operations again later, hence the failure detection should be reliable; if Cfail may join
14
again later, it must be given a new identity. Group management protocols for adding and removing
clients dynamically have been discussed in the context of existing systems, such as VENUS [30] and
SPORC [13].
4 Verification of integrity and consistency of cloud object storage (VI-
COS)
We are now ready to introduce our main contribution, the protocol for verifying the integrity and con-
sistency of cloud object storage, abbreviated VICOS. It leverages AIP from the previous section and
provides a fork-linearizable Byzantine emulation for a practical object-store service, in a manner that
is transparent to the storage provider. We first define the operations of the cloud storage service and
outline the architecture of VICOS. Next we instantiate AIP for verifying the integrity of a simple object
store and show how VICOS extends this to practical cloud storage.
More precisely, VICOS consists of the following components (see Fig. 2):
1. A cloud object store (COS) service with a key-value store interface, as offered by commercial
providers. It maintains the object data stored by the clients using VICOS.
2. An AIP client and an AIP server, which implement the protocol from the previous section for
the functionality of an authenticated dictionary (ADICT) and authenticate the objects at the cloud
object store. The AIP server runs remotely as a cloud service accessed by the AIP client. This is
abbreviated as AIP with ADICT.
3. The VICOS client exposes a cloud object store interface to the client application and transparently
performs integrity and consistency verification. During each operation, the client consults the
cloud object store for the object data itself and the AIP server for integrity-specific metadata. In
particular, AIP server running ADICT stores a cryptographic hash of every object.
Note that the cloud object store as well as the AIP server are in the untrusted domain; they may, in fact,
collude together against the clients.
Client application
VICOS client (Alg. 6)
Cloud object store (COS)
COS client
AIP client with ADICT
(Alg. 1–2 with Alg. 4–5)
VICOS serverAIP server with ADICT
(Alg. 3 with Alg. 4–5)
VICOS server
Figure 2. Architecture of VICOS: the two untrusted components of the cloud service are shown at the
top, the trusted client is at the bottom.
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4.1 Cloud object store (COS)
The cloud object store is modeled by key-value store (KVS) and provides a “simple” storage service to
multiple clients. It stores a practically unbounded number of objects in a flat namespace, where each
object is an arbitrary sequence of bytes (or a “blob,” a binary large object), identified by a unique name
or key. We assume that clients may only read and write entire objects, i.e., it is not possible to read from
or write into the middle of an object, as in a file system.
Our formal notion of a KVS internally maintains a map M that stores the values in V under their
respective keys taken from a universe K. It provides four operations:
1. kvs-put(k, v): Stores a value v ∈ V under key k ∈ K, that is, M [k]← v.
2. kvs-get(k): Returns the value stored under key k ∈ K, that is, M [k].
3. kvs-del(k): Deletes the value stored under key k ∈ K, that is, M [k]← ⊥.
4. kvs-list(): Returns a list of all keys for which a value is stored, that is, the list 〈k ∈ K|M [k] 6= ⊥〉.
This API forms the core of many real-world cloud storage services, such as Amazon S3 or OpenStack
Swift. Typically there is a bound on the length of the keys, such as a few hundred bytes, but the stored
values can be much larger and practically unbounded (on the order of several Gigabytes). For simplicity,
we assume that the object store provides atomic semantics during concurrent access, being aware that
cloud storage systems may only be eventually consistent [4] due to network partitions.
Many practical cloud object stores support a single-level hierarchical name space, formed by con-
tainers or buckets. We abstract this separation into the keys here; however, a production-grade system
would introduce this separation again by applying the design of VICOS for every container.
4.2 Authenticated dictionary implementation (ADICT)
VICOS instantiates AIP with the functionality of a KVS that stores only short values. In order to
distinguish it from the cloud object store, we refer to it as authenticated dictionary, denoted by ADICT,
with operations adict-put, adict-get, adict-del, and adict-list.
The implementation of ADICT uses the well-known approach of building a hash tree over its en-
tries [5, 28, 12]; see Alg. 4–5 for the details of how ADICT is implemented within AIP. The AIP server
stores the values in a map D and maintains a hash tree T , constructed over the list of key-value pairs
stored in the map, according to a fixed sort order on the keys. That is, every leaf node of the hash tree
is computed by hashing the node key, its value, and the key of the successor leaf node together. The
next node has to be included in order to authenticate the absence of a key in response to a query for a
non-existing key (e.g., [28]). The root of the hash tree serves as the authenticator for ADICT.
For the adict-put, adict-get, and adict-del operations, the server extracts those paths from T that are
necessary to verify the correctness of the retrieved value and places them in so. For adict-put and adict-
del operations, queryADICT also places these paths into so because the client needs them to construct
the updated root hash. For adict-list, the complete hash tree is included in so. The asterisks (*) in
Alg. 4–5 denote some additional data and steps necessary to verify the predecessor or successor leaves
for authenticating an absent key (details of this are omitted here and can be found in the literature [12]).
The compatibleADICT(µ, u) function of Alg. 4–5 defines the compatibility relation among the oper-
ations of the authenticated dictionary; VICOS supports the same KVS interface and inherits this notion
of compatibility for the cloud-storage operations. For more general services like databases, one would
invoke a transaction manager here. For ADICT, the compatibility between a first (pending) operation u
and a second (current) operation o is given by Table 1. For instance, adict-put followed by adict-get for
the same key or followed by adict-list are not compatible, whereas two adict-list and adict-get opera-
tions are always compatible.
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Algorithm 4 Authenticated dictionary implementation (ADICT) for AIP, Part 1
state
D : K → {0, 1}∗: authenticated dictionary, initially empty
T : hash tree over D, initially empty
function queryADICT((D,T ), o)
if o = adict-put(k, v) ∨ o = adict-del(k) then
r ← ⊥
so ← sibling nodes on path (*) from k to root in T
else if o = adict-get(k) then
r ← D[k]
so ← sibling nodes on path (*) from k to root in T
else // o = adict-list()
r ← 〈k ∈ K|D[k] 6= ⊥〉
so ← T
return (r, so)
function authexecADICT(o, a, r, so)
if o = adict-put(k, v) ∨ o = adict-get(k) ∨ o = adict-del(k) then
if so is not a valid path (*) from k to tree root a then
return (·, ·, FALSE)
if o = adict-put(k, v) then
insert leaf node k with value v in the tree
s′o ← updated path from k to tree root
a′ ← updated hash-tree root
else if o = adict-get(k) then
if path (*) not consistent with node k holding r then
return (·, ·, FALSE)
s′o ← ⊥
a′ ← a
else if o = adict-del(k) then
delete leaf node k from the tree
s′o ← updated paths from siblings of k to tree root
a′ ← updated hash-tree root
else // o = adict-list()
if r is not list of keys in leaves of tree with root a then
return (·, ·, FALSE)
s′o ← ⊥
a′ ← a
return (a′, s′o, TRUE)
The advantage of considering operation compatibility over commutativity (as used in ACOP [9], for
instance) becomes apparent here: only 8 pairs among the 49 cases shown are not compatible, whereas
22 among 49 cases do not commute and would be aborted with commutativity.
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Algorithm 5 Authenticated dictionary implementation (ADICT) for AIP, Part 2
function refreshADICT((D,T ), o, so)
if o = adict-put(k, v) then
D[k]← v
update path in T from k to root, as taken from so
else if o = adict-del(k) then
D[k]← ⊥
update path in T from k to root, as taken from so
return (D,T )
function compatibleADICT(µ, u)
for o ∈ µ do
if ¬compatibleADICT (u, o) then // See Table 1 for the compatibleADICT () relation on operations
return FALSE
return TRUE
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adict-put(x, ·) √ √ — √ √ √ —
adict-put(y, ·) √ √ √ — √ √ —
adict-get(x)
√ √ √ √ √ √ √
adict-get(y)
√ √ √ √ √ √ √
adict-del(x)
√ √
—
√ √ √
—
adict-del(y)
√ √ √
—
√ √
—
adict-list()
√ √ √ √ √ √ √
Table 1. The compatibleADICT (·, ·) relation for ADICT and the KVS interface, where x, y ∈ K denote
distinct keys
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4.3 VICOS client implementation
VICOS emulates the key-value store API of a cloud object store (COS) to the client and transparently
adds integrity and consistency verification. As with AIP, consistency or data integrity violations com-
mitted by the server are detected through assert; any failing assertion triggers an alarm. It must be
followed by a recovery action whose details go beyond the scope of this paper. Analogously to AIP,
VICOS may return ABORT; this means that the operation was not executed and the client should retry it.
Algorithm 6 Implementation of VICOS at the client.
function vicos-put(k, v)
x← a random nonce
cos-put(k‖x, v)
h← hash(v)
r ← aip-invoke(adict-put(k, 〈x, h〉))
if r = ABORT then // concurrent incompatible operation
cos-del(k‖x)
return r
function vicos-get(k)
r ← aip-invoke(adict-get(k))
if r = ABORT then // concurrent incompatible operation
return ABORT
〈x, h〉 ← r
v ← cos-get(k‖x)
assert hash(v) = h
return v
function vicos-del(k)
r ← aip-invoke(adict-del(k))
if r = ABORT then // concurrent incompatible operation
return ABORT
cos-del (k‖∗) // deletes all keys with prefix k
return r
function vicos-list()
r ← aip-invoke(adict-list())
if r = ABORT then // concurrent incompatible operation
return ABORT
return r
Algorithm 6 presents the pseudo code of the VICOS client. Basically, it protects every object in
the COS by storing its cryptographic hash in the authenticated dictionary (ADICT). Operations on the
object store trigger corresponding operations on COS and on ADICT, as provided by AIP for consistency
enforcement.
In order to prevent race conditions, VICOS does not store the hash of an object under the object’s key
in COS directly, but translates every object key to a unique key for COS. Otherwise, two concurrent op-
erations accessing the same object might interfere with each other and leave the system in an inconsistent
state. More precisely, in a vicos-put(k, v) operation, the client chooses a nonce x (a value guaranteed to
be unique in the system, such as a random string) and stores v in COS using cos-put(k‖x, v) with the
translated key k‖x. Furthermore, it computes h ← hash(v) and stores 〈x, h〉 in AD using adict-put at
key k. The cos-put and cos-get operations actually stream long values. When adict-put aborts due to
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concurrent operations, the client deletes v again from COS using cos-del(k‖x).
For a vicos-get(k) operation, the client first calls adict-get(k) and retrieves 〈x, h〉. Unless this
operation aborts, the client translates the key and calls cos-get(k‖x) to retrieve the value v. After v
has been read (or streamed), the client compares its hash value to h, asserts that they match, and then
outputs v.
Without key translation, two concurrent vicos-put operations o1 and o2 writing different values to
the same key k might both succeed with cos-put(k, v1) and cos-put(k, v2), respectively, but the adict-put
for o2 might abort due to another concurrent operation. Then COS might store v2 but ADICT stores the
hash of v1 and readers would observe a false integrity violation. Thanks to key translation, no versioning
conflicts arise in the COS. Atomicity for multiple operations on the same object key follows from the
properties of AIP with the ADICT implementation. The vicos-del(k) and vicos-list() operations proceed
analogously; but the latter does not access COS.
4.4 Correctness
It is easy to see that the implementation of VICOS satisfies the two properties of a fork-linearizable
Byzantine emulation. First, when S is correct, then the clients proceed with their operations and all
verification steps succeed. Hence, VICOS produces a linearizable execution. The linearization order
is established by AIP running ADICT. Furthermore, when the clients execute sequentially, then by the
corresponding property of AIP, no client ever receives ABORT from ADICT.
Second, consider the case of a malicious server controlling COS and the AIP server together. AIP
ensures that the operations on ADICT (adict-put, adict-get, etc.) are fork-linearizable according to
Sec. 4. The implementation of ADICT follows the known approach of memory checking with hash
trees [5, 28] and therefore authenticates the object hash values that VICOS writes to ADICT. According
to the properties of the hash function, the object data is uniquely represented by its hash value. Since
VICOS ensures the object data written to COS or returned to the client corresponds to the hash value
stored in ADICT, it follows that all operations of VICOS are also fork-linearizable.
5 Prototype
We have implemented a prototype of VICOS in Java; it consists of a client-side library (“VICOS client”)
and the server code (“VICOS server”). The system can be integrated with applications that require
cryptographic integrity and consistency guarantees for data in untrusted cloud storage services. It is
available as open-source on GitHub (https://github.com/ibm-research/vicos).
5.1 VICOS implementation
The client-side library uses the BlobStore interface of Apache jclouds (Version 2.0.0 -Snapshot, https:
//jclouds.apache.org/) for connecting to different cloud object stores. The server runs as a
standalone web service, communicating with the client-side library using the Akka framework (Version
2.4.4, http://www.akka.io).
Akka is an event-driven framework which supports the actor model [20]. It fits perfectly into the
system model of VICOS and allows for rapid development. This simplifies the actual protocol im-
plementation because of the high level of abstraction, especially relating to network operations and
concurrency.
The client library as well as the server code are implemented as actors within the framework. Actors
are independent units which can only communicate by exchanging messages. Every actor has a mailbox
that buffers all incoming messages. By default messages are processed in FIFO order by the actor. This
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allows the server protocol implementation to process all incoming messages sequentially and execute
each protocol step atomically, that is, mutually exclusive with respect to all others. The implementation
of VICOS therefore closely follows the high-level description according to Sec. 3. Note that this clearly
limits the systems performance by not utilizing modern multi-core architecture, on the other hand.
We developed the VICOS client library so that it may easily be integrated into existing applications
to provide integrity protection. It uses the modular approach of AIP instantiated with an authenticated
data structure (ADS). A developer only needs to implement the desired functionality, by defining the
state (e.g., the internal KVS data structure), a set of operations, and their compatibility relation. For
that reason, we have defined two interfaces: state and operation processor. Operations are described us-
ing Google’s Protocol Buffers (https://developers.google.com/protocol-buffers/)
executed by the operation processor. This modular concept allows us to reuse and extend the core
implementation of the protocol.
The VICOS prototype provides a simple KVS functionality by implementing these interfaces. More
precisely, the KVS state is a map supporting GET, PUT, DEL and LIST operations. The KVS opera-
tion processor provides the implementations of query, authexec, refresh, and compatible as described in
Alg. 4–5. The client and the server protocol each contain an instance of the KVS operation processor.
The client exposes a simple KVS interface, adding Java Exceptions for signaling integrity and consis-
tency violations. Furthermore, the client library is completely asynchronous and supports processing
the AIP passive phase in the background without blocking the client process.
The cryptographic signatures can be implemented in multiple ways. According to the security as-
sumptions of the model, all clients trust each other, the server alone may act maliciously, and only
clients issue digital signatures. Therefore, one can also adopt a simplified trust model with “signatures”
provided by a message-authentication code (MAC). For many applications, where strong mutual trust
exists among the clients, MACs suffice and will result in faster execution. On the other hand, this
simplification renders the system more fragile and exposes it easily to attacks by clients.
In particular, VICOS uses HMAC-SHA1 with 128-bit keys provided by the Java Cryptography
Extension as the default signature implementation. The code also supports RSA and DSA signatures
with 2048-bit keys. A user can choose between these signature implementations via a configuration
file. This approach also allows developers to change to a different signature implementation, or even
implement their own according to new requirements. Particularly, this might be useful for porting the
code to other platforms such as mobile devices, with less computation power.
The core implementation of VICOS consists of ∼3400 sloc, the server part is ∼400 sloc more,
whereas the client part including the integration with the evaluation platform (see below) takes∼800 sloc
extra.
5.2 Practical issues and optimizations
While developing VICOS and experimenting with it, we obtained experience with Akka and gained
insight into the protocol’s operation itself. This has led to further optimizations described here.
Bounded pending list. An issue that we discovered in Akka while implementing VICOS is Akka’s
default maximum message size of only 128 kB. In particular, this becomes a problem in VICOS when
REPLY messages include a large partial state or a very long list of pending operations. By configuring
Akka with larger message sizes (we used a maximum size of 128 MB), the direct limitation disappears.
However, we experienced that large messages impact the overall performance negatively. When the
number of pending operations increases, the resulting very large messages slow down the operations of
VICOS. Therefore, we implemented a way to bound the length of the pending-operations list, that is, we
introduced a maximum number of pending operations as a configurable value and modified the protocol.
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When this maximum is reached, the server buffers all new incoming requests (INVOKE messages) until
enough other operations have completed and the number of pending operations goes below the limit.
We tested with different maximum sizes for the pending list from 32 up to 1024 operations, and chose a
limit of 128 for the evaluations.
A more robust solution of that issue would be to signal the clients to wait before sending more re-
quests, instead of just buffering them at the server. Although limiting the number of pending operations
under high server load increases the latency of client requests, it also increases the overall performance
and stability of the system. In summary we found that the benefits of this optimization outweigh its
drawbacks.
Message delivery order. During development we experienced slow performance caused by the FIFO
order in which the protocol actors processed the arriving messages. Therefore, we implemented priority
mailboxes for the server and the client actor and defined a priority rule to prefer COMMIT, UPDATE-
AUTH, COMMIT-AUTH messages over INVOKE and REPLY messages. This has the immediate benefit
that the server processes UPDATE-AUTH messages and thereby completes the PASSIVE PHASE of already
authenticated operations before it starts working on new INVOKE messages. This preference shortens
the list of pending operations directly. Certainly, this may increase the response time for new operations
again, but eventually, it prevents more operations from aborting due to conflicts under high load.
6 Evaluation
This section reports on performance measurements with the VICOS prototype. They study the gen-
eral overhead of integrity protection, the scalability of the protocol, and the effect of (in-)compatible
operations.
6.1 Experimental setup
The experiments use cloud servers and an OpenStack Swift-based object storage service (http://
swift.openstack.org) of a major cloud provider with about two dozen data centers world-wide
(Softlayer — an IBM Company, http://www.softlayer.com/object-storage).
The VICOS server runs on a dedicated “baremetal” cloud server with a 3.5GHz Intel Xeon-Haswell
(E3-1270-V3-Quadcore) CPU, 8 GB DDR3 RAM, and a 1 Gbps network connection. The clients run on
six baremetal servers in total, each server with 2x 2GHz Intel Xeon-SandyBridge (E5-2620-HexCore)
CPUs, 16 GB DD3 RAM, and a 1 Gbps network connection. All clients are hosted in the same data
center. All machines run Ubuntu 14.04-64 Linux and Oracle Java (JRE 8, build 1.8.0 77-b03).
To simulate a realistic environment, we conduct experiments in two settings as shows in Table 2.
A datacenter setting, with all components in the same data center (“Amsterdam”), and a wide-area
setting, where the VICOS server and COS are located together in one data center (“Milan”), and the
clients at a remote site (“Amsterdam”).
Setting Clients VICOS server Cloud object storage Latency [ms]
Datacenter Amsterdam Amsterdam Amsterdam < 1
Wide-area Amsterdam Milan Milan ∼ 10
Table 2. Evaluation setting
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The datacenter setting establishes a best-case baseline due to the very low network latencies (<1 ms).
This deployment is not very realistic in terms of the security model because the clients and the storage
service are co-located.
The wide-area setting exhibits a moderate network latency (round-trip delay time of ∼20 ms) be-
tween the two data centers and models the typical case of geographically distributed clients accessing a
cloud service with its point-of-access on the same continent but in different countries.
COSBench
controller
COSBench
driver
VICOS
client
COSBench
driver
VICOS
client
...
COSBench
driver
VICOS
client
Cloud object store
VICOS server
Figure 3. The experimental setup, with one COSBench controller and many COSBench drivers, access-
ing the cloud storage service through the VICOS client.
The evaluation is driven by COSBench (Version 0.4.2 – https://github.com/intel-cloud/
cosbench), an extensible tool for benchmarking cloud object stores. We have created an adapter to
drive VICOS from COSBench, as shown in Fig. 3. COSBench uses a distributed architecture, consist-
ing of multiple drivers, which generate the workload and simulate many clients invoking concurrent
operations on a cloud object store, and one controller, which controls the drivers, selects the workload
parameters, collects results, and outputs aggregated statistics. In particular, the COSBench setup for
VICOS reports the operation latency, defined as the time that an operation takes from invocation to
completion, and the aggregated throughput, defined as the data rate between all clients and the cloud
storage service.
COSBench invokes “read” and “write” operations, implemented by vicos-get and vicos-put, respec-
tively. Every reported data point involves read and write operations taken over a period of at least 30 s
after a 30 s warm-up. In the experiments two configurations are measured:
1. The native object storage service as a baseline, with direct unprotected access from COSBench to
cloud storage, but accessing the cloud storage through the jclouds interface; and
2. VICOS, running all operations from COSBench through jclouds and the verification the protocol.
6.2 Results
6.2.1 Cryptography microbenchmark
In a first experiment we study how different signature implementation affect the computation and net-
work overhead of VICOS. We implemented digital signatures using RSA and DSA with 2048 bit keys,
and additionally HMAC-SHA1 with 128 bit keys. The cryptographic algorithms are provided by the
SunJCE version 1.8 provider.
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We measured the time it takes on a client to sign and verify an invoke message using the three sig-
nature implementations. Figure 4 shows that the RSA signing takes around 5 ms, while the verification
takes around 220 µs. DSA takes around 4 ms for signing and around 1.5 ms for verification, whereas
HMAC signing and verification only takes less than 20 µs. Additionally, the resulting signature sizes
have a direct effect on the message sizes and the network load. RSA signatures are 256 byte, while DSA
signatures are only 40 byte. HMAC reduces the signature size to 20 byte.
We use HMAC-SHA1 as the default implementation of signatures in the remainder of the evaluation.
Its operations are much faster than for RSA and DSA signatures, reducing the computation overhead
at the client. Moreover, the smaller signature size of HMAC-SHA1 also reduces the network overhead
of VICOS.
13 18
5140
216
1439
3970
1
10
100
1000
10000
HMAC RSA DSA
Signature implementation
Ti
m
e 
[us
] Operation
Sign
VerifyTi
m
e 
[us
]
Figure 4. The average time for digital-signature operations (HMAC, RSA, and DSA); note that the
y-axis uses log-scale.
6.2.2 Object size
In this experiment we study how the object size affects the latency and the throughput of VICOS. We
define a workload with a single client executing read and write operations for objects of size 1 kB, 10 kB,
100 kB, and 1 MB.
Fig. 5 shows that the latency and throughput of VICOS behave very similar to the native system.
As expected, we observe that VICOS introduces an overhead that incurs a small cost compared to
unprotected access to storage. In particular, for the datacenter setting, VICOS increases latency by an
average of 16.2% for read, and 24.0% for write; it decreases throughput by an average of 15.8% for
read, and 17.7% for write. We also expect the overhead to decrease with bigger objects. However, we
could not find this effect in the datacenter setting: here the overhead remains practically constant, from
the small to the large objects. In the wide-area setting, the overhead is approximately the same for the
smaller objects (1 kB and 10 kB), but it indeed decreases as the object size grows and disappears at the
largest object size (1000 kB).
Interestingly, in the wide-area setting, the relative performance in terms of throughput is reversed be-
tween read and write for 1000 kB objects. Whereas read has lower latency and achieves better through-
put than write in all other experiments, this relation is reversed in the right-most data points of Fig. 5.
This may be caused by caching data on the cloud object store, which improves read performance for
smaller objects, but disappears when larger objects are stored and accessed less frequently than in the
datacenter setting.
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Figure 5. The effect of different object sizes: Latency and throughput of read and write operations with
one client.
6.2.3 Number of clients
We also study the scalability of VICOS by increasing the number of clients. The workload uses up
to 128 clients (spread uniformly over the six COSBench drivers), and 64 objects with a fixed size
of 10 kB. One half of the objects are designated for read operations and the other half for write op-
erations, respectively. This division prevents concurrency conflicts among the client operations. As
mentioned in Sec. 5.2, we restrict the size of the pending list in the protocol to 128 operations. We
do not use a large number of clients because of the underlying assumption that clients trust each other,
which might not be realistic in much larger groups.
As Fig. 6 shows, the native system throughput scales linearly until the network is saturated with 64
clients in the data center setting. VICOS follows the same behavior but reaches saturation already
with 32 clients. In contrast, in the wide-area setting, VICOS becomes saturated with 8 clients, from
where throughput remains almost constant and latency grows. No saturation is evident with the native
configuration and up to 128 clients.
The reason for the slower operation in the wide-area experiment is that all requests of the clients
are handled by the VICOS server sequentially and thus it becomes a bottleneck of the system. Due to
the higher latency in the wide-area setting, operations remain longer in the pending queue. This means
more work for the clients and the server. Since the active and passive protocol phases are asynchronous,
clients may invoke the next operation already before they have completed a previous operation. Hence,
they reach limit of the bounded pending queue and the throughput of VICOS remains limited at the rate
imposed by the server’s operation.
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Figure 6. Scalability with the number of clients: Latency and throughput of read and write operations
with 10 kB objects.
6.2.4 Concurrent operations
Finally, we investigate the effect of conflicting concurrent operations. VICOS aborts an operation if
it is not compatible with one of the pending operations (according to Sec. 2.4). In that case the client
has to retry later. Protocols like BST [34] and ACOP [9] are more cautious and abort as soon as two
operations do not commute, which occurs more often. Hence, we define ACOP as our baseline for
this experiment. The implementation throws an abort exception when a conflict occurs; that causes
COSBench to report the operation as failed and to continue immediately with the next operation. At
the end of each experiment COSBench reports the overall operation success rate. We expect a higher
success rate for VICOS compared to ACOP as already discussed in Sec. 4.2.
To evaluate this behavior we created a workload with sixteen clients each invoking read and write
operations over 64 objects with a fixed size of 10 kB. Object accesses are chosen according to “Zipf’s
law”, which approximates many types of data series found in natural and social structures. The Zipf
distribution is based on a ranking of the elements in a universe and postulates that the frequency of any
element is inversely proportional to its rank in the frequency table. Thus, the most “popular” object will
occur approximately twice as often as the second most popular one, three times as often as the third
most popular and so on. Zipf distributions are often observed when users access websites [1]. Figure 7
shows the object access rate using four different values for the Zipf factor θ. For θ = 0.99 the access
rate for the first object (with the biggest contention) is about 20%, and the least often accessed object is
selected only with probability about 0.3%. With θ = 0 the Zipf distribution corresponds to uniformly
random access over the objects.
Since COSBench does not support Zipf distributions by default, we implemented the algorithm
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Figure 7. The effect of different values for the Zipf distribution factor θ of the COSBench object
selector: Selection rate for each object with 10000 selections, 64 objects, and varying θ.
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Figure 8. The effect of conflicting concurrent operations: Success rate of read and write operations with
10 kB objects, sixteen clients, and varying Zipf distribution factors θ.
of Gray et al. [18] for generating a Zipf-like access distribution, as also used in YCSB (https://
github.com/brianfrankcooper/YCSB). With this workload we cause operations to conflict
by progressively increasing θ ∈ {0, 0.5, 0.75, 0.99}. The higher the Zipf factor θ, the more clients
concurrently access the same objects and invoke non-compatible operations, causing aborts.
Figure 8 shows the operation success rates for VICOS and for ACOP, using the four different Zipf
factors. Recall from Sec. 2.4 and from Table 1 that a put operation in the KVS interface is always
compatible with every preceding operation and never aborts. Therefore, the write operations show
100% success rate for VICOS. For the commuting operations in ACOP, on the other hand, writes are
progressively more often aborted with increasing θ. The behavior of reads is similar for VICOS and
ACOP because preceding writes cause aborts equally often.
The advantage of VICOS over protocols considering only operation commutativity becomes evident
here, in that write operations always succeed, and overall the abort rate is significantly reduced.
6.2.5 Summary
The performance evaluation shows that VICOS achieves its goal of adding consistency and integrity
protection while remaining almost transparent to clients using cloud object stores. The cost added over
the raw performance is most visible in the datacenter setting, which is not a realistic deployment for
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the intended applications. Still this overhead remains limited to about 20% for accesses with high
throughput (Sec. 6.2.2). With many clients performing operations concurrently, the extra cost may
become noticeable (Sec. 6.2.3), and further work is needed for decreasing this. It should be added that
the VICOS prototype is currently a proof of concept and not product-level code.
7 Related Work
Many previous systems providing data integrity rely on trusted components. Distributed file systems
with cryptographic protection provide stronger notions of integrity and consistency than given by VI-
COS; there are many examples for this, from early research prototypes like FARSITE [2] or SiR-
iUS [14] to production file-systems today (e.g., IBM Spectrum Scale, http://www-03.ibm.com/
systems/storage/spectrum/scale/). However, they rely on trusted directory services for
freshness. Such a trusted coordinator is often missing or considered to be impractical. Iris [31] re-
lies on a trusted gateway appliance, which mediates all requests between the clients and the untrusted
cloud storage. Several recent systems ensure data integrity with the help of trusted hardware, such as
CATS [35], which offers accountability based on an immutable public publishing medium, or A2M [11],
which assumes an append-only memory. They all require some form of global synchronization, usually
done by the trusted component, for critical metadata to ensure linearizability. In the absence of such
communication, as assumed here, they cannot protect consistency and prevent replay attacks.
In CloudProof [29], an object-storage protection system with accountable and proof-based data
integrity and consistency support, clients may verify the freshness of returned objects with the help of
the data owner. Its auditing operation works in epochs and verifies operations on one object only with a
certain probability and only at the end of an epoch. Moreover, the clients need to communicate directly
with the owner of an object for establishing integrity and consistency.
Cryptographic integrity guarantees are of increasing interest for many diverse domains: Verena [21],
for example, is a recent enhancement for web applications that involve database queries and updates by
multiple clients. It targets a patient database holding diagnostic data and treatment information. In
contrast to VICOS, however, it relies on a trusted server that supplies hash values of data objects to
clients during every operation.
The remainder of this section discusses related work without trusted components for synchroniza-
tion. With only one client, the classic solution for memory checking by Blum et al. [5] provides data
integrity through a hash tree and by storing its root at the client. Many systems have exemplified this
approach for remote file systems and for cloud storage (e.g., Athos [16]).
With authenticated data structures [28, 25], the single-writer, multi-reader model of remote storage
can be authenticated, assuming there is a trusted and timely way to distribute authenticators from the
writer to all readers. In practice, this approach is often taken for software distribution, where new
releases are posted to a repository and authenticated by broadcasting hash values of the packages over a
mailing list. AIP as introduced in Sec. 3 represents one way to generalize ADS for multiple writers.
In the multi-client model, Mazie`res et al. [26, 23] have introduced the notion of fork-linearizability
and implemented SUNDR, the first system to guarantee fork-linearizable views to all clients. It detects
integrity and consistency violations among all clients that become aware of each other’s operations. The
SUNDR system uses messages of size Ω(n2) for n clients [10], which might be expensive. The SUNDR
prototype [23] description also claims to handle multiple files and directory trees; however, the protocol
description and guarantees are stated informally only, so that it remains unclear whether it achieves
fork-linearizability under all circumstances.
As mentioned in Sec. 1, several systems have expanded the guarantees of fork-linearizability to
different applications [13] and improved the general efficiency of protocols for achieving it [10]. Others
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have explored aborting operations [24] or introduced weak fork-linearizability in order to avoid blocking
operations. In particular, SPORC [13], FAUST [8], and Venus [30] sacrifice full linearizability to avoid
aborts and blocking, respectively, and achieve weak fork-linearizability instead. The latter is a relaxation
of fork-linearizability in which the most recent operation of a client may violate atomicity.
The SPORC system [13] is a groupware collaboration service whose operations may conflict with
each other, but can be made to commute by applying a specific technique called “operational trans-
formations.” Through this mechanism, different execution orders still converge to the same state; still
SPORC achieves only weak fork-linearizability.
Furthermore, VICOS also reduces the communication overhead compared to past systems consider-
ably, since SUNDR, FAUST, and Venus all use messages of size Θ(n) or more with n clients, whereas
the message size in VICOS does not depend on n.
The BST protocol [34] supports an encrypted remote database hosted by an untrusted server that is
accessed by multiple clients. Its consistency checking algorithm allows some commuting client opera-
tions to proceed concurrently; COP and ACOP [9] extend BST and also guarantee fork-linearizability
for arbitrary services run by a Byzantine server, going beyond data storage services, and support wait-
freedom for commuting operations. VICOS builds directly on COP, but improves the efficiency by
avoiding the local state copies at clients and by reducing the computation and communication overhead.
The main advantage is that clients can remain offline between executing operations without stalling the
protocol.
8 Conclusion
This paper has presented VICOS, a complete system for protecting the integrity and consistency of
data outsourced to untrusted commodity cloud object stores. It shows, for the first time, how to realize
multi-client integrity protection for generic functions with an authenticated data structure (ADS). Its
two-phase protocol structure reduces the communication overhead compared to previous algorithms.
VICOS works with commodity cloud storage services and ensures the best possible consistency
notion of fork-linearizability. It supports wait-free client operations and does not require any additional
trusted components.
There are several challenges that this paper not address, which remain open for future work. An
interesting question, for instance, is how to recover from an integrity violation. Since we assume only
a single untrusted server and that client data resides at the cloud storage service, orthogonal techniques
are needed for resilience of the data itself.
Another interesting challenge would be to consider malicious clients, as one further step towards a
more realistic system. For small groups of clients our system model makes sense, but for groups with
hundreds of clients it seems difficult to maintain this assumption. The situation is especially interesting
when a client colludes with the malicious server.
Finally, the approach of AIP also be applied to services beyond cloud storage; for example, cloud
and NoSQL databases, interactions in a social network, or certificate and key management services.
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